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tration. This rule also gives a specific right of appeal to the
Supreme Court, to anyone denied the right to take the
examination. The procedure for action and certification
thereof, by the County Board, upon the application for final
examination, are the same as those provided in the case of
applications for registration, previously mentioned herein
in regard to Rule Nine. Applications to take the final ex-
amination in July, arising in Philadelphia and Allegheny
Counties, shall be filed on or before February first, and in
all other counties on or before May first. For the De-
cember examinations, applications from the two first men-
tioned counties must be filed on or before September first
and from all other counties on or before October first.
Rule Thirteen is amplified to allow an applicant who
was not a resident of this State during the whole or any
part of the period of study described by these rules, to be
registered, in the discretion of the Board, when satisfied as
to his good moral character and general and special educa-
tion, as of the time when his studies were commenced, and
to be admitted to final examination upon the completion of
his studies. No certificate recommending admission will be
granted until he has served the regular clerkship of six
months in a Pennsylvania law office as in other cases.
Rule Thirteen-and one-half allowing the Board to limit
the number of times an applicant may take the final exam-
ination, needs no explanation, speaking clearly and de-
cisively for itself.
Those who are interested may secure full particulars
with respect to these requirements by addressing a request
to Walter L. Douglass, Esquire, Secretary of the State
Board of Law Examiners, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
J. F. I.
VENDOR AND VENDEE-DAMAGES RECOVER-
ABLE FROM VENDOR FOR BREACH OF WRITTEN
CONTRACT-STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Seidlek v. Brad-
ley, 293 Pa. 379 (1928), allows the recovery of the value of
the bargain though the vendor was guilty of no fraud be-
yond the bad faith involved in his refusal to convey. The
rule is otherwise when the contract is in parol. To recover
such damages it must then be shown that the vendor
practiced fraud, artifice, or collusion at the inception of
the contract. Otherwise he can recover only what he
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may have paid of the purchase price and his expenses in-
curred in the sale.
The recovery of any damages for breach of a parol con-
tract to sell lands is due to the fact that there is nothing
in the law of Pennsylvania at all similar to the fourth
clause of the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds.'
Pennsylvania is the only state in which this is true.
Everywhere else a requirement similar to that provided
by the 4th section of the Uniform Sales Act exists, i. e.
a note or memorandum signed by the party to be charged.
But in Pennsylvania both parties to a parol contract for
the sale of land have always been permitted to get damages
for the other's breach. 2 It has been declared that, "The
legislature could have meant nothing else by this omission
than to leave such contracts upon the footing which they
would have had, if the act had never been passed * * *. But
though it be true that no estate can be acquired by parol,
and therefore no specific performance can be enforced
by either party, it is equally true, and all the decisions show
it from first to last, that if the vendee sues for damages,
he has precisely the same standing in Court that he would
have if the contract was in writing. The statute of frauds,
therefore, has absolutely nothing to do with the subject."
3
Seidlek v. Bradley, supra, shows that today the
statute has a great deal to do with it. Many cases hold
that in the absence of fraud in the inception of the con-
tract, the vendee cannot recover the value of his bar-
129 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, pp. 824 and 886; 27 C. J. 192;
Bell v. Andrews, 4 Dall. 152 (1799); George v. Bartoner, 7 Watts
530 (1838); Lowry v. Mehaffy, 10 Watts 387 (1840); Wilson v. Clarke,
1 W. & S. 554 (1841); Ewing v. Tees, I Binn. 450 (1808); Moore
v. Small, 19 Pa. 461 (1852); Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424 (1867).
2George v. Bartoner, supra n. 1; McDowell v. Oyer, 21 Pa.
417 (1851); Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418 (1859); Bender v. Bender,
37 Pa. 419 (1861); Malann v. Ammon, 1 Grant 123 (1854); Thompson
v. Sheplar, 72 Pa. 160 (1872); Bell v. Andrews, supra, n. 1; Immel v.
Herb, 43 Super. 111, 116 (1909); Poorman v. Kilgore, 37 Pa. 309 (1860).
8McDowell v. Oyer, 21 Pa. 417, 425 (1851).
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gain for breach of a parol contract. 4 It has always been
held that a parol contract could not be specifically en-
forced, (in the absence of such part performance as is
said to take the case out of the statute.)5 To grant it
to the vendee would be to treat him as the owner in
equity, when the statute declares he cannot become more
than a tenant at will.' To allow it to the vendor is to
ignore the lack of mutuality such a decision would
create.7  It is then conceived that to allow the vendee
to recover the value of his bargain would be to give him
about all he would have gained had specific performance
been allowed, and so to avoid any compulsion of the vendor,
the vendee is allowed merely to get back what he has
4Dumars v. Miller, 34 Pa. 319 (1859); Hertzog v. Hertzog, supra,
n. 2; Bender v. Bender, supra, n. 2; Thompson v. Sheplar, supra, n.
2: McCafferty v. Griswold, 99 Pa. 270 (1881); Heilman v. Weinman,
139 Pa. 143 (1891); Tyson v. Eyrick, 141 Pa. 296 (1891); Walter v.
Transue, 17 Super. 94 (1900). Sedgewick on Damages, 9th Ed. Sec.
1009, states that the rule applies even when vendor knows he has
no title.
5Compare Poorman v. Kilgore, 26 Pa. 365 (1855) and Id. 37 Pa.
309 (1860). Wilson v. Clarke, 1 W. & S. 554 (1841); Irvine v. Bull,
4 Watts 287 (1835); Ellet v. Paxson, 2 W. & S. 418 (1841); Meason
v. Kaine, 63 Pa. 335 (1869); Sands v. Arthur, 84 Pa. 479 (1877);
Sausser v. Steinmetz, 88 Pa. 324 (1879); Schwerdfeger v. Kelly, 223
Pa. 631 (1909); Martz, v. Bower, 94 Pa. Super. 175 (1928). Likewise
while a vendee under a written contract has an insurable interest
in the buildings on the land sold, a vendee under a parol contract
has no such interest. Prospect Dye Works v. Federal Ins. Co., 33
Super. 223 (1906).
6Bender v. Bender supra, n. 4.
7Wilson v. Clarke, 1 W. & S. 554 (1841). It is noteworthy that
this is the only reason why a vendor cannot recover the price, when
he has not signed the sale agreement. The general rule in other
states permits specific performance of a land contract if the de-
fendant has signed, though the contract could not have been enforced
against the vendor for want of his signature. Thus the fourth section
has the effect of abolishing the requirement of mutuality wherever
it is in force. See also Ellet v. Paxson, 2.W. & S. 418 (1841); Title
& Tr. Co., v. R. R., 230 Pa. 160 (1910).
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parted with. 8 Fraud b5, the vendor at the inception of
the contract was held to open the door to a full recovery,
to avoid a multiplicity of suits.9 But the mere fact that the
vendor had no excuse for his nonperformance did not
take the case out of the rule.'0
Seidlek v. Bradley concedes that there are cases
which apply the same rule to written and -verbal contracts.
Haney v. Hatfield, 241 Pa. 413 (1913), applied the parol con-
tract rule to a written contract. Orr v. Geiner, 254 Pa. 308
(1916) and Glasse v. Stewart, 32 Super. 385 (1907), are con-
demned also as cases committing the same error. They
are all overruled.
The origin of the error into which our courts had
fallen is easy to understand. It has always been the law
that a vendee who holds a written contract signed by the
vendor cannot recover the loss of his bargain, if the
vendor cannot make title. Like a vendee under a parol
contract, he can recover only money paid, interest and
expenses." And again bad faith or "fraud" operates
to let in the loss of the bargain.12  But the fraud required
when the contract is written is very different from the
fraud required when it is verbal. The proper understand-
ing of this difference requires an understanding of the
reason for refusing the value of the bargain as part of
sSausser v. Steinmetz, supra, n. 5; Rineer v Collins, 156 Pa. 342
(1893); M'Clowry v. Croghan, 31 Pa. 22 (1856); McNair v. Compton,
35 Pa. 23 (1859); Hertzog v. Hertzog, supra, n. 2; Dumars v. Miller,
supra, n. 4; Bellas v. Wolff, 11 Super. 150 (1899); Ruckert v. Domenec,
2 W. N. C. 195 (1870); In Bower v. Cessna, 62 Pa. 148 (1869), Justice
Sharswood declares that when the vendor is unable to make title,
the same measure of damages is applicable regardless of the parol or
written character of the contract. The whole opinion in this case is
instructive.
9Harris v. Harris, 70 Pa. 170 (1871).
lORineer v. Collins, supra, n. 8; McNair v. Compton, supra, n
Thompson v. Sheplar, supra, n. 2; McCafferty v. Griswold, 99 Pa.
270 (1881); supra, n. 4; Allison v. Montgomery, 107 Pa. 455 (1884);
Grey v. Howell, 205 Pa. 211 (1903); Stephens v. Barnes, 30 Super.
127 (1905).
'1 Bitner v. Brough, 11 Pa. 127 (1849); Burk v. Serrill, 80 Pa.
413 (1876).
"2Panagos v. Plack, 277 Pa. 431, 435 (1923); Richter v. Goldberg,
78 Super. 309, 312 (1921); Daley v. Reed, 63 Super. 507, 510 (1916);
Stephens v. Barnes, supra, n. 10; Bartram v. Hering, 18 Super. 395
(1901).
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the damages in suits by the vendee for innocent breach
by a vendor of a written contract. In these cases the
reason given in the parol contract cases, that this would
amount to specific performance, no longer has force,
for the contract is now in writing and can be specifically
enforced. Accordingly, it is only in those cases in which
the vendor cannot give title, and the vendee cannot get
specific performance for this new reason, that the vendee
may not get the equivalent of specific performance, the
value of the bargain. It would be absurd to compel a pur-
chaser to resort to specific performance to realize the value
of his bargain. If he can get it directly, why not let the
vendor retain his land and pay the cash, if this is also
agreeable to the vendee? That the vendee has his choice
of remedies is the point decided by the instant case.
But why, it may be said, should a vendor be excused
from paying the value of the bargain when he sells what
is not his? No adequate reason exists. The explanation
of the rule is its antiquity. It began with Flurean v.
Thornhill ' 3 when the law of real property was in such a
state and there was such an absence of adequate record-
ing of land titles that it was practically impossible for one
to be sure he had a good title. It was feared that to
award full damages to the disappointed vendee would deter
men from putting their land upon the market and so the
development of the country would be retarded. So an
implied condition was invented and read into all land
contracts, that if the vendor did not have title, the contract
was at an end. The English cases gave full damages when
the vendor knew his title was defective and, of course,
a refusal to convey by one who has a good title justifies
the award of full damages.
The Pennsylvania cases give a further reason for re-
fusing full damages. They call attention to the ancient
rule allowing but limited damages for breach of covenants
of warranty in deeds. This rule has long survived the
reasons which explain its origin but it would unduly pro-
long this rkote to account for this ancient rule. But
even if it must stand until changed by legislation, it does
not follow that the same limitation upon the amount of
damages recoverable for a broken contract to convey must
be applied. The breach of the warranty may develop at
a remote date when the allowance of the grantee's full
loss would be ruinous to the grantor and his heirs. The
132 Win. B1. 1078 (1776).
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breach of the contract to convey will occur almost im-
mediately. There is nothing in the suggestion that vend-
ors could convey and so reduce their liability. The vendee
simply refuses to accept the deed, when it will not give
a marketable title. It is high time to take the final step
and bring the measure of damages for breach of a con-
tract to sell land into harmony with the long settled rule
in sales of goods, in which the recovery of the value of
the bargain has always been allowed. Of course the Statute
of Frauds must be complied with in both cases, if such
a recovery is to be had. This is undoubtedly the tendency
of all American decisions and the Pennsylvania cases
should be brought into line.14
Of course, such fraud as will permit the recovery of
the value of the bargain in the case of a breach of a parol
contract will a fortiori permit such a recovery when the
contract is in writing, i. e. fraud in the inception of the con-
tract, as when the vendor knows he can not give a good
title. If a vendor under a written contract is to be relieved
of paying the value of the bargain in case he has no title,
he should be required to expressly so stipulate in his sale
agreement. The time for the judicial invention of such
conditions has long since passed.
It may be well to add that to render a land contract
specifically enforceable by both parties in Pennsylvania,
it is only necessary that the vendor sign. The vendee's
assent can always be proven by parol.'5 So too, the lessor
'4 See note in 9 Col. L. Rev. 438.
15Parrish v. Koons, 1 Pars. Sel. Eq. Cas. 78 (1884) was decided
on the mistaken notion that the vendee must sign, though the con-
trary had already been decided in Lowry v. Mehaffy, 10 Watts 387
(1840). Not only can a vendee or lessee enforce a contract he did
not sign, McFarson's App., 11 Pa. 503 (1849); Shoofstall v. Adams,
2 Grant 209 (1858); Smith's App., 69 Pa. 474 (1871); Shrut v. Huselton,
272 Pa. 113 (1922); Brodhead v. Reinbold, 200 Pa. 618 (1901); Matson
v. Slaughenhayt, 64 Super. 581, 583 (1916); Whitman v. Reading, 191
Pa. 134, 140 (1899); but so also can the vendor fully enforce a con-
tract which the vendor only has signed, Tripp v. Bishop, 56 Pa. 424
(1867), the leading case; Johnson v. Cowan, 59 Pa. 275 (1868); Swiss-
helm v. Swissvale Laundry Co., 95 Pa. 367 (1880) ; Smith and Fleck's
App., 69 Pa. 474 (1871). Where a contract for the purchase of land
is made by one in his own name, the fact that he was the agent of
an undisclosed principal, may be shown by parol evidence. Hall v.
White, 123 Pa. 95 (1889); Brodhead v. Reinhold, 200 Pa. 618,623 (1901).
But see dictum contra in Humphrey v. Brown, 291 Pa. 53 (1927). The
vendor's only remedy is an action at law, since this remedy is entirely
adequate. Kaufman's App., 55 Pa.383 (1867); Dech's App., 57 Pa. 467
(1868); Smaltz's App., 99 Pa. 310 (1882).
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only need sign a lease. So too, it is the grantor's, the
lessor's, and the.vendor's agent who must have authority
in writing to execute the deed, the lease or the sale con-
tract for the owner. The one taking title promises only
to pay money and the proof of such a promise by parol
cannot cast doubt on land titles. Our Statute of Frauds
has a single object, the certainty of land titles and the
protection of land owners. This is in conspicuous contrast
to the rule in all other states, for they all have the fourth
section of the British Statute, which requires purchasers
of land to sign the agreement if they are to be charged
by an action brought thereon. In Pennsylvania it is im-
material who is plaintiff, the vendor's signature is vital
and the purchaser's is surplusage. Everywhere else it
is the defendant's signature that is vital and that of the
plaintiff is surplusage, since mutuality is not required
outside of Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania when the ven-
dor his signed, the remedies of the parties are mutual.
If he has not signed, neither can specifically enforce the
contract. Curiously, however, it has never been held
that a vendor, who cannot collect the price because the con-
tract is in parol, may not for this reason collect the value
of his bargain. The notion of the requirements of equal
justice to both parties has not been carried so far. It
would appear that if giving the vendee the value of the
bargain is in effect specific performance, the same is true
if such a recovery is allowed to the vendor. But all the
cases are to the contrary. 6
In conclusion it may be added that confusion in the
Pennsylvania decisions and the frequently inaccurate com-
ments upon them by leading text writers is attributable to
three distinct causes. As Justice Kephart has pointed out,
one is the failure to note the difference in the rules ap-
plicable to parol contracts and to written contracts. An-
other is the failure to note that decisions in any other
state applicable to written contracts cannot be compared
with our decisions because of the difference both in the
substance and purpose of our statute as compared with
that in force elsewhere. Finally, confusion results from the
16Bowser v. Cessna, supra, n. 8; Ashcom v. Smith, 2 P. & W.
211 (1830); Ewing v. Tees, 1 Binn. 450 (1808); Tompkins v. Haas, 2
Pa. 74 (1845) ; Ellet v. Paxson, supra, n. 5; But see the clearly erroneous
decision in Carner v. Peters, 9 Super. 29 (1898), in which the court
talks about "fraud" of the vendee as a prerequisite of a recovery of
the value of the bargain.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
assumption that reasoning applicable in vendee's suits is
equally applicable in vendor's suits and that the rules must
be the counterparts of each other .1
The instant decision was foreshadowed in one case,
Bartran v. Hering,5 in which it was declared that a vendor
who declines to perform a bad bargain, in such form as to
be susceptible of specific enforcement, must pay the value
of the bargain, if the vendee elects to bring assumpsit. It
is well that the highest court has now set this matter at
rest. J. P. McKeehan
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-CONFLICTING PRE-
SUMPTIONS-EFFECT OF REMOVAL OF DISABIL-
ITY UPON MATRIMONIAL CONDUCT-A recent Penn-
sylvania case, Holben's Estate, 93 Super. Ct. 472 (1928),
presents some interesting questions of the law of marriage,
(1) the conflict between the presumption of the continuance
of a meretricious relationship and the presumption of mar-
riage arising from subsequent cohabitation and reputation
as husband and wife, (2) the creation of a true marital
status after removal of a disability which has made the pre-
vious matrimonial conduct illicit.
The case involved the right to share as widow in the
distribution of a decedent's estate. The claimant was mar-
ried in 1871 to one Eastman, in Tennessee, where they lived
until 1882. At that time, he left the state without her
knowledge, and she never heard from him again. Soon
after this desertion, she removed to Pennsylvania, and
sometime prior to 1898 heard from a friend in Tennessee
that her husband was reported to be dead. She employed
an attorney to ascertain the truth of this report, which he
was unable to do. In 1898, she married the decedent, and
they lived together as husband and wife until his death in
1926. In 1903, the claimant learned that her first husband
had died, after remarrying in Michigan in 1900. On these
facts the Orphans' Court disallowed her claim as widow.
On appeal the Superior Court, with two judges dissenting,
17See 3 Sedgewick on Damages, 9th Ed. sec. 1009. 2 Sutherland
on Damages, sec. 583, p. 2003; Parrish v. Koons, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas.
78 (1844); Twitchell v. Phila. 33 Pa. 212 (1859); Schultz v. Burlock, 6
Super. 574 (1898); and other clearly erroneous decisions which might
be cited.
1818 Super. 395 (1901).
